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/VOT

DISSENT OF COMMISSIONER J. CLAY SMITH, JR., ON THE
APPROVAL FOR LITIGATION OF THE CASE OF DARLENE
BARTEK v. THE KENT UPHOLSTERY CO., INC., ON THE
ISSUE OF SUCCESSOR COl-WANY LIABILITY

.
On Ju1yla, 1980, the General Counsel sought this Commission's
approval for litigation of a case entitled, Darlene Bartex v.
The Kent Upholstery Co., Inc.

Bartex was a sex discrimination

case in which the alleged act of discrimination occurred at a
time in' which the Kent Upholstery Co., Inc., was not owned by
the present owners.

The proposed suit, however, was brought

solely against Kent Upholstery, Inc.
Upon query as to whether or not the present owners of the
defendant company had continued the acts of discrimination which
were commenced by its previous owners, it was indicated that no
consideration had been given to that issue.
Since the legal issue of successor liability was not
!

presented to the Commission for evaluation before litigation
against respondent was approved by the majority for litigation, *
I dissented for the following reasons:
Courts have long held that a successor company is liable
for acts of discrimination committed by its predecessor only
when certain standards are met.

Those standards were articulated

by the Sixth Circuit in EEOC v. MacMi 11an Blo"e'de 1" 'Conta"iriers', 'Inc.,
503 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1974), and by the Ninth Circuit in
Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975).

*

After the Commission meeting, staff from the General Counsel's
Office,aindicated that the previous owners may be joined in the
suit ~en filed in court.

DISSENT - 2
In Macl1illan and Slack the Courts of Appeals held that
the following criteria must be met in order for a successor
company to be

h~ld

liable for discriminatory acts of its

l

predecessor:

(~) whether the successor company had notice of

the charge; (2) the ability of the predecessor to provide relief;
(3) whether there has been a substantial continuity of business

operations; (4) whether the new employer uses the same plant;
(5) whether he uses the same or substantially the same workforce;

(6) whether he uses the same or substantially the same supervisory

personnel; (7) whether the same jobs exist under substantially the
same working conditions; (8) whether he uses the same machinery,
equipment and methods of production; and (9) whether he produces
the same product.
Under the facts presented, since these factors were not
presented
, to the Commission for its evaluation, there is a great
possibility that it has authorized enforcement action against the
wrong party.
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Hence, I respectfully dissent.
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